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Abstract: This article analyses the feasibility and the potential implementation of collective
arbitration in Europe. Although arbitration has reached a significant success in Europe, up
to this date this mechanism has not been used to settle collective disputes yet, as there are
many barriers hindering its implementation. But class arbitration is being successful in
other parts of the world (especially in the United States) and, therefore, its feasibility should
not be rejected. In fact, the EU bodies recommend the Member States to consider the
possibility to settle collective disputes by out-of-court proceedings. This article considers
both the obstacles and the benefits of this kind of arbitration, and includes some proposals.
This work concludes with the only two sorts of collective arbitration systems implemented
in Europe: the Spanish Consumer Collective Arbitration System and the German Corporate
Arbitration System ruled by the German Arbitration Institution (DIS).
Résumé: Cet article analyse la faisabilité et le potentiel de mise en œuvre de l’arbitrage
collectif en Europe. Bien que l’arbitrage ait atteint un succès significatif en Europe,
jusqu’à présent aucun recours n’a été fait à ce mécanisme pour régler des différents
d’ordre collectif, en raison des nombreux obstacles empêchant sa mise en œuvre.
Cependant l’arbitrage collectif fonctionne avec succès dans d’autres parties du monde
(particulièrement aux États-Unis) et, de par ce fait, le bien-fondé du recours à ce
procédé ne peut être écarté. D’ailleurs, les institutions Européennes recommandent
que les États Membres étudient les possibilités de résoudre les différends de nature
collective hors des tribunaux. Cet article considère à la fois les obstacles et les bénéfices
de ce type d’arbitrage. Ce travail présente en conclusion les deux seules formes d’arbi-
trage collectif en exercice en Europe: le Système d’Arbitrage Collectif à la
Consommation Espagnol et le Système d’Arbitrage des Sociétés règlementé par
L’Institut d’Arbitrage Allemand (DIS).
Zusammenfassung: Der Beitrag analysiert die Umsetzbarkeit und mögliche
Implementierung von Schiedsverfahren bei Sammelklagen in Europa. Auch wenn die
Schiedsgerichtsbarkeit einen signifikanten Erfolg in Europa erreicht hat, wurde dieser
Mechanismus bis heute nicht dazu verwendet, Sammelstreitigkeiten zu lösen, da inso-
weit viele, die Implementierung hindernde Barrieren bestehen. In anderen Teilen der
Welt hingegen (insbesondere in den Vereinigten Staaten) sind Schiedsverfahren bei
Sammelklagen erfolgreich und daher kann eine Umsetzbarkeit nicht von der Hand
gewiesen werden. Tatsächlich empfehlen die EU-Einrichtungen den Mitgliedsstaaten
die Möglichkeit der außergerichtlichen Beilegung von Sammelstreitigkeiten zu
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erwägen. Der Beitrag eruiert sowohl die Schwierigkeiten als auch die Vorteile dieser Art
der Schiedsverfahren sowie einige Vorschläge. Abschließend werden die beiden einzigen
in Europa eingeführten Arten von Schiedssystemen bei Sammelklagen behandelt: das
spanische Schiedsverfahren für Verbraucherfragen und die vom Deutschen Institut für
Schiedsgerichtsbarkeit e.V. (DIS) verfasste Verfahrensordnung für gesellschaftsrech-
tliche Streitigkeiten.
Keywords: arbitration, collective actions, class actions, ADR, consumers.
1. Introduction
1. Collective actions are alien to the European legal tradition. It must be recog-
nized, however, that a significant shift has occurred in Europe over the last years,
as this type of actions has started to be considered differently, resulting in legisla-
tive initiatives adopted by both different EU Member States and the European
institutions.
Even though the prevailing scepticism against the US class actions1 has
been overcome, there is still a long way to go. This type of actions is not
provided for in the legislation of all the European States yet. Besides, the
countries’ laws where these actions are provided for have some dysfunctions
that render their implementation and development difficult. In this
context, discussing collective arbitration in Europe is not only surprising, but
especially early.
2. Arbitration is one of the forms of alternative dispute resolution achieving the
highest degree of success in practice. Nevertheless, up to date, arbitration has not
been used for the collective protection of rights and interests in Europe, since there
are multiple difficulties that hinder its implementation in this field.
The increasing use of arbitration clauses in standard-form contracts has
encouraged the debate about the potential incorporation of collective actions into
arbitration. Many have spoken out against the recognition of the possibility to file
collective actions in arbitration, arguing that these actions do not comply with the
principles characterizing this institution, especially its quickness, its informality, its
voluntary nature and its flexibility. It cannot be obviated, however, that this
1 The terminology used in this article must be clarified. Terms such as US class actions and European
collective actions have been chosen in order to make a difference between these two types of
actions. This article mentions both US class arbitration and European collective arbitration,
respectively. However, please note that the term used by the European institutions is collective
redress.
On the distinction between ‘class arbitration’, ‘mass arbitration’ and ‘collective arbitration’,
see Stacie STRONG, Class, Mass and Collective Arbitration in National and International Law (New
York: Oxford University Press 2013).
On the topic of terminology, see Duncan FAIRGRIEVE & Geraint HOWELLS, ‘Collective Redress
Procedures: European Debates Source’, 58. ICLQ 2009(2), pp 379–409.
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practice is being successful in other parts of the world (especially in the United
States2) and, therefore, its feasibility and implementation should not be rejected. In
fact, the EU bodies urge the Member States to consider the possibility to settle
collective disputes by out-of-court proceedings.
3. It may occur that Europe finally echoes the advantages of the US class action
arbitration in the mid or long term. But it may also happen that the significant
obstacles hindering its application in Europe finally render its development impos-
sible. Therefore, considering the uncertain future of this legal mechanism, this
article aims to analyse the feasibility and the potential implementation of collective
arbitration in this continent. To begin with, this article presents a brief legislative
overview of collective actions in Europe and the most recent initiatives the
2 It should be recalled that the emergence of collective arbitration in the United States is due, to a
large extent, to the businesses’ reluctance to court class actions. By the late 1980s, in fear of
judicial class actions that may be brought against them, businesses started to include arbitration
clauses in their agreements, believing that arbitration would prevent the filing of class actions and
forcing claimants to individually solve their disputes by arbitration procedures. However, this belief
proved to be wrong, since arbitral tribunals started to accept class actions. Stacie STRONG,
‘Resolving Mass Legal Disputes Through Class Arbitration: The United States and Canada
Compared’, 37. N.C.J. Int’l L. & com. Reg. 2011–2012, p (921) at 936.
See Daniel R. HIGGINBOTHAM, ‘Buyer Beware: Why the Class Arbitration Waiver Clause
Presents a Gloomy Future for Consumers’, 58. Duke Law Journal 2008(1), pp 103–137; Jean
R. STERNLIGHT, ‘As Mandatory Binding Arbitration Meets the Class Action, Will the Class Action
Survive?’, 42. William & Mary L. Rev. 2000–2001, pp 1–127; Gary BORN & Claudio SALAS, ‘The
United States Supreme Court and Class Arbitration: A Tragedy of Errors’, 19. Maastricht J. Eur. &
Comp. L. 2012, pp 21–48; Michael P. DALY, ‘Come One, Come All: The New and Developing World of
Non-Signatory Arbitration and Class Arbitration’, 62. U. Miami Law Rev. 2007–2008, pp 95–128; Jean
R. STERNLIGHT & Elizabeth J. JENSEN, ‘Using Arbitration to Eliminate Consumer Class Actions: Efficient
Business Practice or Unconscionable Abuse?’, 67. Law and Contemporary Problems 2004(1–2), issue
on Mandatory Arbitration, pp 75–103, also @ scholarship.law.duke.edu/lcp/vol67/iss1/4/.
In Europe, collective actions have not spread yet, as European businesses do not face the same
situation and fears as American companies. Therefore, it is unlikely that European businesses will
establish arbitration clauses in their standard-form contracts in order to avoid this type of actions.
Besides, it must be also considered that, in accordance with the Council Directive 93/13/EEC,
on unfair terms in consumer contracts, pre-dispute arbitration clauses in consumer contracts are
forbidden. This is not the case of the United States, since the Federal Arbitration Act does not make
a difference between consumer disputes and other types of disputes, accepting pre-dispute arbitration
agreements in consumer contracts.
Outside the United States, the most important cases on collective arbitration that have been
reported are: one issued by a Colombian arbitral institution (Tribunal Arbitral de la Cámara de
Comercio de Bogotá, in Valencia / Bancolombia). See Stacie STRONG, ‘Enforcing Class Arbitration in
the International Sphere: Due Process and Public Policy Concerns’, 30. University of Pennsylvania
Journal of International Law 2008, p 1, and another one by a Canadian arbitral institution (Kanitz /
Rogers Cable Inc., [2002] 58 O.R. (3d) 299, 21 B.L.R. (3d) 104. See Stacie STRONG, ‘Class Arbitration
Outside the United States: Reading the Tea Leaves’, Legal Studies Research Paper Series, Research
Paper No. 2009-36, University of Missouri, @ ssrn.com/abstract=1517272.
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European institutions have adopted. Then the potential acceptance of collective
arbitration in the European context will be discussed, considering both the obsta-
cles hindering its adoption and the advantages that may result from its implemen-
tation, including some proposals. Finally, two existing sui generis collective
arbitration examples from Spain and Germany will be presented.
2. Collective Actions in Europe
4. Before analysing the potential implementation of collective arbitration in
Europe, it is essential to present a brief overview of judicial collective actions.
Individual court actions are the usual means or proceedings intended to
settle conflicts, to avoid damage and to claim compensation in Europe. Besides
these proceedings, several Member States have started to introduce different types
of collective or group actions, both to prevent and to put an end to illegal practices,
as well as to ensure the granting of a compensation in case of mass damage, in
fields such as the protection of consumers, competition, financial services and the
protection of the environment.3
5. Unlike US class actions, which can be used in any type of civil proceedings without
any sector restriction, the field of implementation of collective action mechanisms in
many European States is restricted to very specific sectors. By way of example, in
Germany, collective redress mechanisms are only used to recover losses resulting from
capital investments, whereas their use is restricted to consumer-related proceedings in
countries such as Finland or Spain.4 In turn, in other countries such as Sweden,
Norway and the Netherlands, collective redress has a wider scope of application.
Almost all the EU Member States are aware of the injunctive collective
redress mechanisms, which spread after the adoption of Directive 1998/27/
3 Based on the objectives and claims sought, collective actions in Europe comprise two categories:
collective actions seeking the cessation of illegal practices or behaviours (injunctive collective redress)
and collective actions seeking a compensation for any loss and damage caused (compensatory collective
redress). Both types of actions can be filed in the event that a mass damage has been caused.
See Christopher HODGES, The Reform of Class and Representative Actions in European Legal
Systems: A New Framework for Collective Redress in Europe (Oxford: Hart 2008). Sonja E. KESKE,
Group Litigation in European Competition Law, A Law and Economics Perspective (Antwerpen:
Intersentia 2010); Tiana L. RUSSELL, ‘Exporting Class Actions to the European Union’, 28. B.U. Int’l
L.J. 2010, p 141; Hans-Jürgen AHRENS, ‘Injuctive and Compensatory Collective Redress Mechanism
Against Restraints of Competition and Unfair Trade Practices’, 6. Journal of European Tort Law 2015
(2), pp 145–162; Stacie STRONG, ‘Cross-border Collective Redress in the European Union: Constitutional
Rights in theFaceof theBrussels IRegulation’, 45.ArizonaStateLawJournal2013, pp233–279,@ssrn.
com/abstract=208550; Rebecca MONEY-KYRLE & Christopher HODGES, ‘European Collective Action:
Towards Coherence?’, 19.Maastricht J. Eur. & Comp. Law 2012, pp 477–504.
4 For a detailed study of judicial collective actions, consulting Andrea PLANCHADELL GARGALLO, Las
acciones colectivas en el ordenamiento jurídico español. Un estudio comparado (Valencia: Tirant Lo
Blanch 2014) is highly recommended.
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EC, currently applicable as Directive 2009/22/EC, on injunctions for the
protection of consumers’ interests. However, not all the EU Member States
are aware of the compensatory collective redress mechanisms, as they are only
provided for in approximately the half of the Member States. Besides, these
States have significant legislative differences and this is the reason why the
harmonization of these legislative measures is being sought.5 Their differences
are remarkable, especially in terms of the type of collective action available
and their main features, such as their admissibility, the legal standing of the
parties involved,6 the use of opt-in or opt-out approaches,7 the role of the
judge, the requirements for the provision of information, the funding and the
distribution of the compensations.
6. As a result of these inconsistent criteria, the European Union institutions have
included in their political agenda the need to implement a collective redress system
based on the European legal practices. After the European Commission adopted a
Green Paper on antitrust damages actions8 and the appropriate White Paper,9
including proposals on specific collective redress mechanisms, in 2008, the
Commission published the Green Paper on consumer collective redress10 and, in
2011, the public consultation ‘Towards a more coherent European approach to
collective redress’11 was carried out.
On 2 February 2012 the European Parliament adopted the
resolution ‘Towards a Coherent European Approach to Collective Redress’,
in which it called for any proposal in the field of collective redress to take
the form of a horizontal framework including a common set of principles
providing uniform access to justice via collective redress within the Union.12
And on 11 June 2013 the Commission issued a Communication ‘Towards a
5 The quick acceptance of injunctive collective redress actions is self-evident. However, this quick
acceptance clashes with the resistance to the compensatory collective redress mechanisms. See
Laura CARBALLO PIÑEIRO, ‘La construcción del mercado interior y el recurso colectivo de consumi-
dores’, in Esteban de la Rosa (ed.), La protección del consumidor en dos espacios de integración:
Europa y América (Valencia: Tirant Lo Blanch 2015), p 1059.
6 The legal capacity required to bring these actions varies in the Member States. In some countries,
the power to file collective actions has been granted to public authorities only (e.g. the
Ombudsman in Finland), whereas, in other countries, private organizations such as a consumer
associations (Bulgaria) and both individuals and legal entities (Sweden) are entitled to bring
collective redress actions.
7 A first group of countries including Austria, Sweden and Italy has implemented the opt-in model,








European Horizontal Framework for Collective Redress’,13 which took stock of
the actions to date and presented the Commission’s position on some central
issues regarding collective redress. This Communication was also supported by
the so-called Recommendation on common principles for injunctive and
compensatory collective redress mechanisms in the Member States concerning
violations of rights granted under Union Law.14 In these last documents, the
EU institutions urge all the Member States to implement collective redress
mechanisms at the national level for both injunctive and compensatory relief,
with respect to the basic principles set out across the Union, while taking
into account the legal traditions of the Member States and safeguarding
against abuse.15
7. To get an idea of the trend that intends to become established in the European
Union for the regulation of collective actions, a brief presentation into the most
relevant principles considered in the Recommendation is required.
– For the legal standing required to bring a collective redress action, the
Member States are urged to specify the entities that are entitled to file
such actions, subject to some given criteria. Amongst the criteria con-
sidered, in order to ensure the entity’s legal standing to defend and
represent a specific group of claimants, the entity must be non-profit
organization, there must be a direct relation between the entity’s main
goals and the rights that have been breached, and the entity must have
sufficient financial and human resources, as well as legal knowledge.16
– It must be also ensured that the representing entity or the group of
claimants spread information to any potential claimants on the alleged
violation of rights, as well as their intention to file an action, always
keeping a balance between the right of access to information and the
protection of the defendant’s reputation.
– Based on the application of the ‘loser pays principle’, the funding of
these proceedings is a key aspect to be considered. For this purpose,
third parties not involved in the proceeding can provide the financial
13 eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/ALL/?uri=COM:2013:0401:FIN.
14 eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/ALL/?uri=celex:32013H0396. The Commission should assess the
implementation of the Recommendation on the basis of practical experience by 26 July 2017 at the latest.
15 Unfortunately, the European Commission has not adopted a Regulation or a Directive on this
matter. It is well known that communications and recommendations are not binding and may not
be sufficient to ensure the necessary, consistent implementation in the Member States.
16 These requirements ensure an evident control of the entities allowed to bring such type of actions.
Representative actions can only be brought by entities which have been officially designated in
advance or by entities which have been certified on an ad hoc basis by a Member State’s national
authorities or courts for a particular representative action.
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resources required for the collective redress action, putting forward
certain measures intended to prevent abusive litigation and any con-
flicts of interest that may arise.17
– The Commission supports the constitution of the claimant party by the
opt-in model, in contrast to the opt-out approach. However, the
opt-out approach is exceptionally considered in the event that, based
on specific legal provisions or judgments, it is justified for the sound
administration of justice.
– For the lawyers’ professional fees, the Member States should ensure that
the method established to calculate the lawyers’ fees does not result in an
incentive to file actions that are unnecessary from the perspective of the
parties’ interests, in order to prevent the so-called pactum de quota litis.
Furthermore, punitive damages are also forbidden.18
– The Commission acknowledges that alternative dispute resolution proce-
dures can be an effective means of obtaining redress in mass harm
situations and, therefore, these procedures should be always available,
along with the judicial collective redress or as an element that may be
voluntarily used alongside judicial claims. Hence, the Commission
Recommendation urges the Member States to encourage the parties
involved in legal actions resulting from mass harm cases to settle any
issue related to compensations by reaching consensus or an out-of-court
agreement, both at the pre-trial stage and during the civil trial. For this
purpose, the Member States should ensure that the judicial collective
redress mechanisms include the possibility to allow the parties involved,
both before and throughout the procedure, to access the alternative
dispute resolution mechanisms available. The use of these of these alter-
native means will depend on the consent of the parties involved.19
3. Collective Arbitration in Europe?
8. It has been proven that, on the one hand, collective actions have started to be
incorporated into the different legal systems of the EU Member States and that the
17 The claimant party should declare to the court, upon the start of the proceeding, the origin of the
financial resources that will be used to fund the legal action. Furthermore, the Recommendation
contains a list of causes that result in the stay of the proceeding and some prohibitions on the
behaviour of such third party.
18 The compensation awarded to natural or legal persons harmed in a mass harm situation should not
exceed the compensation that would have been awarded, if the claim had been pursued by means of
individual actions.
19 The Commission Communication also states that the parties involved in collective proceedings
should have the possibility to solve their collective disputes by out-of-court procedures, whether
with the intervention of a third party (e.g. by a mechanism such as arbitration or mediation) or
without such intervention (e.g. by agreements reached by the parties).
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European institutions are promoting their use, provided that these actions adhere
to several harmonizing common principles based on European legal tradition. On
the other hand, arbitration is an alternative dispute resolution mechanism widely
spread in Europe20 and in constant evolution.21
Thus, it is not surprising that we wonder whether these two approaches can
be combined, i.e. whether collective actions can be submitted in an arbitration
proceeding. The following sections present an analysis about this possibility. As
mentioned above, although arbitration has reached a significant success in Europe,
this mechanism has not been used to settle collective disputes yet, as there are
many barriers hindering its implementation.
3.1. Barriers Hindering the Acceptance of Collective Arbitration
9. When assessing the possibility to protect or defend collective interests or rights
through arbitration proceedings, several obstacles emerge. Neither the arbitration
laws nor the Regulations of the arbitration institutions established in the Member
States have specifically dealt with this issue (except for two specific cases that will
be discussed below). Therefore, in practice, the acceptance of collective arbitration
is hard to be achieved.
10. Firstly, the voluntary, consensual nature of arbitration (its main difference from
jurisdiction) must be emphasized. Only the parties that voluntarily decide to resort to
arbitration will be subject to this mechanism. This is one of the reasons why we
consider that, in the event that collective arbitration is finally accepted in Europe,
the participation in the proceeding should be established through the voluntary
participation (opt-in) model, in such a way that those who have not decided to settle
their dispute by this mechanism do not become affected by the arbitral proceeding.
20 It may even be stated that ‘arbitration is trendy’, as reflected in the emergence of a significant
number of legislative measures that have tried to provide a new perspective of arbitration, as well
as to promote its use by the harmonization of the Arbitration Rules in a significant number of
European countries. See Silvia BARONA VILAR, ‘El arbitraje en el marco del impulso de las ADR
como cauces no jurisdiccionales de resolución de conflictos. Referencias a la conciliación y a la
mediación’, in Barona Vilar (dir.), Tratado de arbitraje, Análisis del derecho español y del derecho
boliviano (Cohabamba (Bolivia): Kipus 2014), p 43.
21 José MiguelJÚDICE, specifically deals with arbitration’s evolution and ongoing capacity to surprise
legal experts. According to Júdice, arbitration has managed to continuously adapt to the new
realities and changes. For instance, 20 years ago, no one could imagine that arbitration may
solve disputes over matters such as competition, taxes, intellectual property, bankruptcy, etc.
Especially, no one would think that arbitrators would be able to adopt precautionary measures or
ex parte preliminary orders. The acceptance of third parties in arbitration procedures was not even
considered either (Bernard HANOTIAU & Eric A. SCHWARTZ, ‘Collective Arbitration in Europe: The
European Way Might Be the Best Way’, ICC Dossier XIV- Class & Group Actions in Arbitration,
ICC Product No. 771E, 2016, pp 46–57).
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11. Secondly and in direct relation to the paragraph above, the extension of the
res judicata in the award must be considered. In fact, the binding force of an
arbitral award is the major obstacle for collective actions in arbitration. An arbitral
award has an inter partes effect, which is not compatible with the erga omnes effect
of court decisions, which put an end to collective actions and do have a res judicata
effect in connection with all the harmed parties, regardless whether they have
participated in the proceeding or not.
In the case that the provisions established for judicial actions were applicable to
collective actions in arbitration, it may occur that those consumers wishing to solve a
same dispute by an arbitral proceeding would be forced to act through the collective
arbitration proceeding, without the possibility to resort to the courts of justice.22 This
would result in a clear violation of the right of due process. Hence, we reckon that, in the
case that collective actions become accepted in arbitration, individual consumers should
be also allowed to defend their rights and interests through the courts of justice.23
12. Confidentiality is another aspect that must be taken into account, as this is one of
themost highlighted features of arbitration and one of themain reasons why this dispute
resolution mechanism is used. For collective arbitration, we wonder how a potential
action may be disclosed in order to attract any harmed parties while respecting the
characteristic confidentiality of this mechanism. The solution to this issue has proven to
be difficult. Thus, to achieve the effectiveness of collective arbitration, confidentiality
seems to be a feature that needs to be to some extent abandoned and reduced.24
13. A fourth barrier can be added up: the recognition and enforcement of an award
rendered on a collective action in a foreign country. It would not be unusual that an
award rendered to settle a collective action would need to be enforced in several
countries. In such a case, one should wonder how an award rendered in a collective
proceeding could be recognized and enforced in a country where this mechanism is
not accepted. As it can be seen, there are many doubts to be cleared up. A further
obstacle would be the objection to the recognition of the arbitral award. It must be
taken into account that Article V.1.b of the New York Convention on the Recognition
and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards (1958) establishes that the recognition
and the enforcement of the award may be refused, upon the request of the party
against whom the award is invoked, in the case that such party furnishes to the
competent authority where the recognition and enforcement is sought, proof that:
the party against whom the award is invoked was not given proper notice of the
22 If we accept collective arbitration, we will face the risk that someone can be bound by the award
without even being aware of its existence.
23 Manuel Jesús MARÍN LÓPEZ, ‘Objeto y límites del arbitraje de consumo’, Revista Jurídica de Castilla
La Mancha 2005(39), p 183.
24 This is the case of the American Arbitration Association (AAA), since, with the acceptance of class
arbitration actions, confidentiality was no longer protected. In fact, most of the awards rendered by
the AAA are available on its website.
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appointment of the arbitrator or of the arbitration proceedings or was otherwise
unable to present his case. Therefore, in the situation where the arbitration was not
opt in, any member of the group that has not been properly notified about the
collective arbitration action may object to the recognition of the award.25
14. Filing collective actions in arbitration raises many other questions, including
the arbitrability of the dispute,26 the effective compliance with the call to and
provision of the summons, the validity of the collective arbitration clause,27 etc.
For space limitations, these issues will not be discussed in this article, although
special attention should be paid to these barriers.
3.2. Positive Aspects
15. Despite the reluctance discussed in the previous section, arbitration may offer
several advantages in collective actions. Although collective arbitration is not free
from objections, the potential of this mechanism to solve collective disputes should
be considered. For instance, the feasibility of class arbitration can be seen in the US
legal system, even though this practice is not exempt from criticism.
Amongst the virtues of arbitration, the specialization of arbitrators should
be emphasized, as specialization will be helpful to effectively and more quickly
solve the difficult legal issues that may arise in these proceedings. The possibility to
choose an expert on the dispute ensures the fairest and the most appropriate
resolution for the parties’ expectations. Specialization also leads to solutions
25 For a similar provision, refer to Antonio PINTO MONTEIRO & José Miguel JÚDICE, ‘Class actions &
Arbitration in the European Union- Portugal’, Estudos em Homenagem a Miguel Galvão Teles,
volumen II (Coimbra: Almedina 2012), p 203.
This is not the only provision in the Convention that may be claimed to object to the
recognition and enforcement of an award. Objections may be also raised in accordance with
Art. V.1.d): ‘(d) The composition of the arbitral authority or the arbitral procedure was not in
accordance with the agreement of the parties, or, failing such agreement, was not in accordance
with the law of the country where the arbitration took place’ or Art. V.2.b): ‘The recognition or
enforcement of the award would be contrary to the public policy of that country.’
26 Especially in those countries where judicial collective actions are not even provided for in their civil
procedure regulations.
27 In the event of dealing with an arbitration clause in a standard-form contract, one should firstly
analyse whether collective arbitration is considered as a possibility, is prohibited or is not even
mentioned. A detailed analysis about this type of clauses in US class arbitration can be found in
Bernard HANOTIAU, Complex Arbitrations (Multiparty, Multicontract, Multi-issue and Class Actions)
(Kluwer International 2005), pp 266–274. Please, refer also to the fourth chapter of the out-
standing monograph by Stacie STRONG, Class, Mass and Collective Arbitration in National and
International Law, pp 169–227.
See also Marci A. EISENSTEIN, ‘Enforcing Arbitration Clauses in Consumer Class Actions: An
Uncertain Future’, 35. Brief 2005–2006, pp 30–40 and Thomas A. DOYLE, ‘Protecting Nonparty
Class Members in Class Arbitrations’, 25. ABA Journal of Labor and Employment Law 2009–2010,
pp 25–36.
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adapted to the case with a higher pragmatism and with the possibility to directly
apply the solution to the practice.
Furthermore, arbitration will solve many of the issues that usually arise when
determining a competent tribunal for an international collective dispute, since the
parties will be able to choose the tribunal based on their specific needs. In arbitration,
the parties are not only entitled to freely appoint the arbitrators, but to even choose the
place of arbitration, the language and the governing law. Not to mention the very nature
of arbitration, which in many cases reveals the parties’ wish to reach an agreement.
Although it should be recognized that collective arbitrationmaymisrepresent the
quickness or swiftness characterizing arbitration, a collective action will be likely to be
settled sooner by an arbitral tribunal than in a court of justice. Besides, we should also
take into account that, in comparison to court proceedings, arbitration offers significant
advantages to settle transnational disputes, since the recognition and enforcement of
arbitral awards in other countries is easier than for court judgments, for which there is
no international instrument similar to the New York Convention of 1958.
16. To these advantages, the pros of collective procedures should be also added,
including, for instance, the cost reduction resulting from conducting a single
arbitration proceeding instead of multiple arbitration actions; the avoidance of
parallel arbitration proceedings with similar claims and, as a result of them, the
possibility of receiving contradicting awards. In any case, the advisability or appro-
priateness of resorting to arbitration or to a court of justice in order to settle
disputes affecting a group of claimants should be determined based on the nature
and the circumstances of the rights and interests affected by each specific case.
3.3. Proposals for the implementation of Collective Arbitration
in Europe
17. The flexibility of arbitration makes us wonder, at least, whether the accep-
tance of collective arbitration in Europe is desirable. If so, we should also consider
the parameters that would be required to establish and implement collective
arbitration in this continent.
We firstly wonder whether the amendment of the procedural and arbitral
laws in the different European countries and the incorporation of collective arbi-
tration and its legal regime into such laws would be required or, on the contrary,
whether the regulation of this type of arbitration and its specific features in the
Regulations to be established by the European arbitration institutions would suf-
fice. As far as we are aware, collective arbitration is neither specifically provided for
nor prohibited by the current European laws. However, these laws do not seem to
consider collective arbitration as a possibility either.28 Therefore, without affecting
28 Except for the sui generis collective arbitration approaches implemented in Spain and Germany, as
discussed in the fourth section of this article.
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the incorporation and the thorough implementation of this possibility in the
Regulations of any arbitration institutions that may decide to conduct collective
arbitration, it would be advisable to establish the feasibility of collective arbitration
in the procedural regulations of each State. Until such a time as this legislative
measure is taken, there are many difficulties hindering this type of arbitration. 29
18. In any case and according to the European perspective, we find that collective
arbitration in Europe will be only feasible under an opt-in system. In fact, most of the EU
Member States that provide for some sort of judicial collective actions in their legislation
are using the voluntary participation (opt-in) approach..30
The opt-in principle preserves to a larger extent the individuals’ rights to decide
whether they wish to participate in a collective arbitration proceeding or whether,
on the contrary, they intend to settle the dispute by individual arbitration or even
by judicial proceedings. Hence, only those individuals really wishing to settle their
dispute by arbitration and in a collective manner will be affected by the award that
will be finally rendered. This will be the only means to ensure that an award
granted on a collective arbitration proceeding will not bind other potentially
entitled claimants that have not joined such action. Thus, those who have not
specifically and voluntarily decided to join this dispute resolution mechanism will
not be affected by the eventual award, an effect more in keeping with the principles
established in the constitutions of most European countries and in the Charter of
Fundamental Rights of the European Union (Art. 47).31
In contrast to the opt-out model, the opt-in system ensures that all the
members of a group in a collective arbitration proceeding are aware of the fact
that the dispute affecting their rights and interests will be settled in a collective
proceeding, jointly with the rights and interests of the other members of the
29 Some of the aspects that should be regulated include the criteria that should be established to
accept collective arbitration, the entity responsible for deciding on its acceptance, the party that is
responsible for notifying the members of the group and the manners to serve the notices, as well as
the party responsible for the costs incurred in the process. To take such decisions, the same criteria
established for the courts of justice may be used and adapted to the arbitration mechanism: This
has been the methodology used by some of the major arbitration institutions in the United States,
since they have taken class actions, as provided for in the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, as a
basis, taking advantage of the extensive case-law on the construction of such rules. However,
considering the flexibility allowed in arbitration, innovative approaches on certain issues that are
restricted in the courts of justice may be well taken in arbitration.
30 In turn, the voluntary exclusion (opt-out) model is used in Portugal, Bulgaria and the Netherlands
(in collective transactions), as well as in Denmark, (in clearly defined representative actions for the
protection of consumers).
See Emanwel Josef TURNBULL, ‘Opting Out of the Procedural Morass: A Solution to the Class
Arbitration Problem’, 20. Widener Law Review 2014, pp 43–79, @ ssrn.com/abstract=2196921.
31 For a detailed study on the opt-in model, see Scott DODSON, ‘An Opt-In Option for Class Actions’,
115. Michigan Law Review 2016, @ michiganlawreview.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/11/
115MichLRev171_Dodson.pdf.
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group.32 Regarding this subject (although for judicial proceedings), we should
remember that the European Commission sets out in the Recommendation of
2013 that, in accordance with the European horizontal framework of collective
redress, the claimant party should be formed on the basis of the opt-in principle
and any exception to this principle should be established in the law or in a court
order and should be duly justified by reasons of sound administration of justice.
19. Besides incorporating an opt-in model, clear, univocal criteria should be
established on the representative entities’ capacity to file a collective arbitration
claim. For this purpose, the minimum requirements established by the European
Commission in the Recommendation of 2013 may be applied to arbitration for the
entities intending to represent harmed individuals in collective actions.
Europe should try to avoid the same errors the US class arbitration system
has made and should also prevent any possibility of abusive litigation. To achieve
this goal, several safeguards must be included. For instance, any pactum de quota
litis for the provision of legal services, uncharacteristic of the legal tradition of
most Member States, should be avoided. Additionally, by adopting the ‘loser pays
principle’, the filing of unjustified claims may be prevented.
20. Finally, we consider that collective arbitration may be supported by the develop-
ment of alternative dispute resolution mechanisms carried out online (the well-known
Online Dispute Resolution or ODR). The online system may become an optimal forum
for the settlement of mass disputes with harmed individuals located in different
countries, a circumstance that is more and more common as a result of the consumers’
business transactions performed on the Internet. Hence, the existing European net-
works (ECC, FIN-Net, RLL, etc.), already helping consumers to individually access the
alternative dispute resolution mechanisms available in other countries, may also assist
those consumers with similar claims to access the appropriate alternative collective
dispute resolution mechanisms available in other Member States.
4. Two Sui Generis Examples of Collective Arbitration in Europe
21. As repeatedly mentioned above, arbitration is not used in Europe to settle
collective disputes (yet). Only two Member States have provided for a sort of
collective arbitration system, although it is significantly different from the US
class arbitration system. These two mechanisms implemented in Europe are the
Spanish consumer collective arbitration system and the German corporate arbitra-
tion system, discussed throughout the following pages.33
32 It should be recognized, however, that the voluntary exclusion (opt-out) approach is safer for the
defendant, since only those who specifically choose not to join the action will be entitled to file a
new action.
33 Other European States have considered their potential suitability but these systems were not finally
adopted. This is the case of Luxembourg, where the Minister for the Treasury and the Budget
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4.1. The Spanish Collective Consumer Arbitration Scheme
22. The Spanish Royal Decree 231/2008, of 15 February, which establishes the
Consumer Arbitration System, has implemented ‘collective consumer arbitration’
in the Spanish legal system.34 However, despite the name, injunctive or compensa-
tory collective actions cannot be filed through this mechanism.
4.1.1. Introduction: Main Features
23. The name ‘collective consumer arbitration’ refers to the fact that the claims of
a group of consumers can be submitted to arbitration but those consumers file their
actions individually. Therefore, the collective consumer arbitration governed by
this Royal Decree can be understood just as a mechanism intended to settle the
individual claims of several consumers, based on the same facts or cause of action,
within the framework of a single arbitration proceeding and through a single
proceeding that is established for this purpose. However, any collective or diffuse
rights and interests of the group of consumers are not protected, even when the
potential harmed parties have been determined or may be easily determined. In
accordance with this system, consumers must file their arbitration actions indivi-
dually. As such, only those consumers that have taken part in the arbitration
procedure will be entitled to be compensated in the case that a favourable award
is rendered.35
24. This collective consumer arbitration is administered by a Consumer
Arbitration Board (Junta Arbitral de Consumo) that has jurisdiction over the
territory where the consumers and users whose rights and economic interests
may have been harmed reside. In the event that the consumers and users affected
reside in more than one Autonomous Community, the competence falls upon the
National Arbitration Board (Junta Arbitral National).36
analysed the option of collective arbitration in order to solve the multiple claims filed by the
investors involved in Madoff’s case.
Stacie STRONG also states that Ireland and its ‘Deputy matter’ provides an intriguing example
of how large-scale arbitration can develop in a jurisdiction that does not offer large-scale relief in
its national courts. ‘Large-Scale Resolution in Jurisdictions Without Judicial Class Actions:
Learning from the Irish Experience’, 22. Ilsa Journal of International & Comparative law 2016(4).
34 The Spanish consumer arbitration system is a free administrative service to solve disputes between
consumers and professionals or businesses on consumer matters setting aside those cases dealing
with intoxication, injury, death or that show reasonable indications of a criminal offence.
35 Pursuant to s. 56 of the Spanish Royal Decree, the object of collective consumer arbitration is the
resolution in a single consumer arbitration of those conflicts that, based in the same factual
presumptions, would have the power to injure the collective interests of consumers and users
and that affect a determined or determinable number of such persons.
36 It must be briefly specified that, in Spanish consumer arbitration, several different bodies deal with
consumer arbitration cases. The most important ones are:
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25. For this type of arbitration, the standing to sue is only direct. Thus, the
indirect or representative standing used to defend collective or diffuse interests
in a judicial proceeding is not allowed. It must be taken into account that, even
though these cases deal with collective interests, the award will only have an
impact on the rights and interests of the group of consumers that have taken
part in the arbitration proceeding. Hence, any other consumers that have been
also harmed by the same facts or practices but have not participated will not be
affected by the award that will be eventually rendered and, as a result, such
consumers will be fully entitled to file an ‘ordinary’ arbitration proceeding or a
judicial proceeding in order to claim their individual rights. In such a case, the
arbitrator or the judge will not be bound to the award made in the collective
arbitration proceeding.37
4.1.2. The Arbitral Procedure
26. The collective consumer arbitration procedure, provided for in sections 56 to
62 of the abovementioned Spanish Royal Decree, mainly consists of the following
steps38:
(1) The president of the competent Consumer Arbitration Board is the
one to decide whether to arbitrate on a collective basis or not. This
(1) The Consumer Arbitration Boards, which are responsible for the management of arbitration.
These boards comprise of a chairman and a secretary and such positions fall upon public
servants. These boards may have jurisdiction over a municipality, an association of munici-
palities, a province or an autonomous community. Besides, there is a National Arbitration
Board, attached to the Spanish National Consumer Institute, and hears any arbitration
actions the scope of which goes beyond the jurisdiction of an Autonomous Community,
provided that the consumers and users are affected by disputes that also go beyond such
scope.
(2) Arbitral Tribunals: they are appointed for each specific case, hear the dispute and render an
award. Arbitral tribunals comprise one or three arbitrators. For tribunals made up of three
arbitrators, they are appointed as follows: an arbitrator representing the consumers, an
arbitrator representing the industry involved in the action, and a chairman of the arbitral
tribunal, appointed by the Administration to which the Consumer Arbitration Board is
attached.
On the general features of the Spanish consumer arbitration system, see Manuel Jesús MARÍN
LÓPEZ, ‘La nueva regulación del arbitraje de consumo: el Real Decreto 231/2008, de 15 de
febrero’, Diario La Ley 2008(6905) and Diana MARCOS FRANCISCO, El arbitraje de consumo y
sus nuevos retos (Valencia: Tirant Lo Blanch 2010).
37 Raquel BONACHERA VILLEGAS, ‘El Real Decreto 231/2008, la anhelada modificación del sistema
arbitral de consumo’, Diario La Ley, Sección Doctrina, 30 October 2008(7045), XXIX, Ref. D-307.
38 An English translation of this articles can be found in Stacie STRONG, ‘Collective Consumer
Arbitration in Spain: A Civil Law Response to US-Style Class Arbitration’, 30. Journal of
International Arbitration 2013(5), pp 495–510.
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decision can be taken on his/her own initiative or, alternatively, upon
the request of the associations representing the consumers in the
territory where the consumers’ collective interests have been harmed
or upon the request of the arbitration boards with a lower territorial
scope.39
Once the agreement to initiate the proceeding has been adopted, the board will ask
the company or the professional responsible for the facts claimed to answer, within
a term of fifteen days, whether such company or professional agrees to submit the
dispute to collective consumer arbitration and, if so, to propose a settlement
agreement to fully or partially satisfy the consumers potentially affected. In the
case that the company or professional agrees to submit the dispute to arbitration, a
public announcement to all the consumers affected will be issued, so that such
consumers can join and defend their rights. This announcement will be published
in the Official Gazette of the appropriate territory.40 The announcement will
remain in force for a two-month term after the date of publication. After such
term, the president will appoint the arbitration tribunal responsible for hearing the
case and the later shall proceed pursuant to the general rules applicable to arbitral
proceedings. The consumers intending to settle their disputes through the
collective proceeding must file their claims within the said period.41 After this
term, only the claims submitted before the hearing will be accepted, provided that
they do not have a retroactive effect on the claims already submitted.42
39 It must be clarified that the consumers affected are not entitled to file the proceeding but this
proceeding must be filed by the consumer associations representing them. It does not mean,
however, that such associations have an extraordinary standing to file the collective action, since
their intervention is confined to this possibility, i.e. to request the commencement of the collective
consumer arbitration proceeding in which the consumers affected will necessarily enter an
appearance.
40 The president of the consumer arbitration board also has the power to undertake other means of
publicizing the notice (Art. 59.1).
According to the RD, the notice must indicate that the consumers can protect their individual
rights and interests through the collective proceeding; where the consumers and users may go to
access the terms of any proposed settlement; and the consequences of a failure to join the action in
a timely manner.
41 As it can be observed, the identity and the number of consumers involved in the action can be
known only after the proceeding has commenced. These circumstances clash with the European
Parliament resolution of 2 February 2012, ‘Towards a Coherent European Approach to Collective
Redress’, para. 20, which estates: ‘for a representative action to be admissible there must be a
clearly identified group, and identification of the group members must have taken place before the
claim is brought’.
42 It must be noted that this is a sort of accumulation of individual actions, rather than a collective
claim.
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The company’s acceptance to submit to collective arbitration results in the
stay of any individual arbitration proceeding based on the same facts that may be
filed at the time being – except proceedings that have already been initiated in front
of an arbitral tribunal- and transfers the procedures to the Arbitral Board that is
competent to coordinate the collective arbitration within fifteen days from the
notice of the businesses’ or professionals’ acceptance. Furthermore, the Spanish
Royal Decree also stipulates that the defendant will be entitled to file an objection
at any time during individual arbitration proceedings, including the hearing, and,
in such a case, the arbitral tribunal will decline jurisdiction to hear the case and will
submit the case to the appropriate consumer arbitration board that has jurisdiction
to deal with such proceeding.
(2) The award must be rendered within a term of six months after the
two-month term starting on the date of publication of the public
announcement to the harmed parties (s. 62). Although it is not
specifically established in the Royal Decree, the award will only have
an impact on the consumers that have participated in the arbitral
proceeding, either because they filed their claim after the public
announcement or because their claim was being processed separately
and was incorporated into the collective arbitration proceeding.
Hence, other consumers affected by these facts but who did not file
an action after the announcement will be not entitled to benefit from
the award, since, for such consumers, the award will be neither
considered as res judicata nor have an ultra partes (beyond the par-
ties) effect. Accordingly, such consumers will be entitled to start the
judicial or arbitral proceedings that may be relevant.
4.1.3. Is the Spanish Collective Consumer Arbitration Really ‘Collective’?
27. In short, the Spanish consumer arbitration system can hear individual and
even collective claims of consumers and users, provided that they take part in
the arbitral proceeding. The collective arbitration system established in the
Spanish law is not an actual collective procedure by which a single subject
acts and defends the rights and interests of several consumers through such
proceeding in the terms used in the judicial way. This is, however, a sort of
subjective accumulation of arbitration claims against a same business or profes-
sional based on a similar causa petendi or cause of action that is settled through
a single proceeding.43
43 According to Laura CARBALLO PIÑEIRO, a vehicle to aggregate claims is all that can be found in the
name ‘collective consumer arbitration’ (Bernard HANOTIAU & Eric A. SCHWARTZ, ‘Collective
Consumer Arbitration in Spain’, in ICC Dossier XIV- Class & Group Actions in Arbitration, p 88).
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Although the Spanish Royal Decree on consumer arbitration has several
defects and lacks courage regarding the recognition of collective arbitration
actions, this system is a first step that offers the possibility to settle, through
arbitration, the disputes of a large number of individuals. Therefore, we cele-
brate the progress made by this law. This is a unique type of arbitration that
may enlighten the arbitral institutions wishing to incorporate mass dispute
resolutions into their regulations.44
28. It must be recognized, however, that the Spanish collective consumer
arbitration mechanism has been seldom used. In fact, it seems that the spread
of this mechanism is not being promoted at all. For instance, this trend has
been observed in the disputes resulting from the trade of preference shares by
some bank entities, since the parties (especially bank entities) have chosen to
file thousands of individual arbitration claims instead of promoting a collective
arbitration action.
4.2. The German Corporate Arbitration Scheme
29. The judgment delivered on the 6th of April 200945 (‘Arbitrability II’) by the
Federal Court of Justice of Germany (Bundesgerichtshof – BGH-) established that
corporate disputes may be settled by arbitration, subject to several requirements:
(1) The arbitration agreement must be incorporated in the articles of
association with the consent of all shareholders. If the arbitration
clause is agreed upon in a separate agreement, the consent of all
shareholders is necessary. All shareholders are bound by the arbitra-
tion agreement.
(2) Each shareholder must be informed about the commencement of the
arbitration proceedings and thus be invited to participate in the
arbitral proceedings, at least as an intervening party.
(3) All shareholders must be able to participate in the constitution of the
arbitrators unless the arbitrators are appointed by a neutral
institution.
44 This Royal Decree provides parties with a number of benefits, including the ability to establish
collective arbitration through what is in effect a post-dispute submission agreement. This techni-
que successfully overcomes one of the primary obstacles to large-scale consumer arbitration outside
the United States, namely, the prohibition on pre-dispute arbitration agreements in cases involving
consumers. Stacie STRONG, 30. J Int’l Arb. 2013, p 498.
45 BGH (German Federal Court of Justice) 6 April 2009, II ZR 255/08, juris.bundesgerichtshof.de/cgi-
bin/rechtsprechung/document.py?Gericht=bgh&Art=en&nr=47949&pos=0&anz=1 = BGHZ 180, 221.
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(4) It must be guaranteed that all disputes regarding shareholder resolu-
tions relating to the same subject matter are concentrated in one
tribunal in order to avoid contradicting or inconsistent decisions.
4.2.1. The DIS Supplementary Rules
30. Shareholder disputes are only arbitrable if the articles of association contain
an arbitration clause and if the arbitration clause complies with the requirements
set out in the decision of the BGH. Due to the high standards set by the BGH it can
be assumed that hardly any of the arbitration clauses currently used in articles of
association meet these requirements. Thus, most articles of association will need to
be amended before disputes among shareholders will be arbitrable.46
To facilitate the use of arbitration in shareholder disputes, that same year –2009-,
the German Arbitration Institution (Deutsche Institution für Schiedsgerichtsbarkeit, DIS)
prepared an arbitration model clause and adopted the Supplementary Rules for
Corporate Disputes (Ergänzende Regeln für gesellschaftsrechtliche Streitigkeiten), by
which this institution regulates a sort of sui generis collection arbitration mechanism
intended to settle this type of disputes.47
The scope of these Rules is remarkably reduced. The rules are confined to corporate
disputes, especially those concerning limited liability companies Gesellschaft mit
beschränkter Haftung (GmbH48) or partnerships that may arise amongst the share-
holders of a company or between a company and its shareholders in connection with
the statutes or articles of association of such company.49
46 Thomas LENNARZ, ‘Germany: GmbH Shareholder Disputes Now Arbitrable’, 76. International
Journal of Arbitration, Mediation and Dispute Management 2010, p 305 ff.
47 This regulation is applied alongside the DIS Arbitration Rules (DIS-Schiedsgerichtsordnung)
adopted in 1998.
The DIS Supplementary Rules for Corporate Disputes provide a sensible framework for
corporate disputes. Shareholders who wish to submit their disputes to arbitration should consider
applying these rules rather than developing their own set of rules in order to prevent the risk that
such self-made rules may fail to meet the very strict requirements set out by the Federal Supreme
Court (Jan KRAAYVANGER & Mark C. HILGARD, ‘Arbitrability of Shareholders’ Disputes Under German
Law’, 26. International Litigation Quarterly 2009(1), www.mayerbrown.com/files/Publication/
e19d0046-f67e-44bc-9f8a-bb6a455cb262/Presentation/ PublicationAttachment/a6512dcc-8b5e-
4602-8fad-e37557005e22/Mark-Hilgard-Article.pdf.
48 The ‘GmbH’ is the most popular legal form of a limited liability company in Germany. Almost one
million of them are registered in Germany. Typically, they have between one and perhaps 10 share-
holders. In contrast, the legal form of an ‘AG’ (stock corporation) is better suited for and often chosen
by companies with a larger number of shareholders and the legal form required for companies listed on
a stock exchange in Germany. In order to understand the nature of shareholder disputes, see the briefly
explanation of certain elements of German law governing GmbHs by Christian BORRIS, ‘Collective
Arbitration: The European Experience’, in Bernard Hanotiau & Eric A. Schwartz(eds), ICC Dossier
XIV- Class & Group Actions in Arbitration, pp 80–87. ICC Product No 771E, 2016.
49 It must be taken into account that, in accordance with the German law, introducing an arbitration
clause in the statutes or articles of association of corporations listed on the stock exchange is not
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4.2.2. Corporate Arbitration ´s Special Features
31. The special features of this type of corporate arbitration regulated by these
Rules stem from the concept of the so-called ‘Concerned Others’ (Betroffener). The
concerned others may be all the shareholders of the company (former or current
shareholders), or even the company itself, who may be affected by the award that
will be finally made. All the concerned others must be granted the opportunity to
join the arbitration proceeding, either as a party or as an intervenor
(Nebenintervenient), with their appropriate rights and duties, as the case may be.50
In order to identify the concerned others, the claimant must specify in the
statement of claim the shareholders (or the company itself) to whom the effects of
the arbitral award must be extended. For this purpose, the claimant must provide
the DIS Secretariat with an address of service and must request the DIS Secretariat
to also deliver the statement of claim to the Concerned Others. On the other hand,
the defendants will be also entitled to identify further concerned others.
Upon the delivery of the statement of claim to the concerned others, such
concerned others will have a term of thirty days following the receipt of the
statement of claim to specify, in writing, whether they want to join the proceeding,
their position (on the claimant’s or on the defendant’s side) and whether they
intend to join the proceeding as a party or as an intervenor.51 In the event that a
Concerned Other fails to declare its joinder within the said term, this shall be
deemed to be a waiver of participation in the arbitral proceeding..52 Therefore, we
can conclude that, even though it is not specifically stated, this is a voluntary
participation (opt in) approach that is fully in keeping with the European
parameters.
32. For the appointment of the arbitral tribunal, the Rules provides for several
guidelines. For a proceeding with a sole arbitrator, the DIS Appointing Committee
will be responsible for nominating the arbitrator in the event that the parties have
failed to reach an agreement regarding such appointment within the appropriate
term. For proceedings to be settled by three arbitrators, each of the parties and
allowed. Therefore, these Rules do not apply to this type of companies. In turn, the Rules set out
that the Federal Court of Justice of Germany has not decided yet whether this prohibition also
applies to ‘small’ corporations with a limited number of shareholders and not listed on the stock
exchange.
50 For instance, those joining the proceeding as a party will participate with all the rights and duties
pertaining thereto at the moment their declaration of joinder is received by the DIS Secretariat. On
the contrary, those joining the proceeding as intervenors will be entitled to the rights of a
compulsory intervenor in the sense of s. 69 German Code of Civil Procedure.
51 A concerned other will be entitled to join the arbitral proceeding at a later moment, but its capacity
to participate in the proceeding will be significantly reduced.
52 In any case, the arbitral tribunal will keep the concerned others updated regarding the progress of
the arbitral proceeding, providing them with copies of certain relevant documents.
382
intervenors (the claimant and the defendant) will be entitled to choose an
arbitrator. In the case that either party fails to reach an agreement within
the appropriate term, the DIS Appointing Committee will be responsible for
nominating the arbitrators. The two arbitrators appointed by the parties or by
the Appointing Committee will nominate the Chairman of the Arbitral
Tribunal.
33. Section 9 of the Rules specifies that the existence of parallel arbitral
proceedings with a similar purpose are not allowed and stipulates that the
arbitral proceeding that has been initiated first (main arbitral proceeding) pre-
cludes the conduct of an arbitral proceeding initiated at a later point in time
(subsequent arbitral proceeding).53 Therefore, in the case that a statement of
claim is filed in a subsequent proceeding within the term established for the
concerned others to join the main proceeding, it will be deemed that this new
concerned other joins the main proceeding, unless this concerned other refuses
to join. On the contrary, in the event that a concerned other has not filed the
statement of claim within the appropriate term or has refused to join the main
proceeding, he/she will be treated as if he/she had not joined the main proceed-
ing. Thus, it is understood that such concerned other may join the main
proceeding (at that moment or at a later point in time) 54 or otherwise he/she
would not be entitled to defend his/her claim by another arbitral proceeding,
since the DIS Supplementary Rules clearly provide for that a subsequent arbitral
proceeding is not admissible.
34. For the costs of the arbitral proceeding, the ‘loser pays principle’ is applic-
able. However, considering the specific circumstances of each case, the arbitral
tribunal may share the costs between both parties or allocate the appropriate
proportion of the costs to each party.55
35. One should wonder who will be bound to the award that will be finally
rendered. As set out both in section 11 of the Rules and in the model clause,
the effects of an arbitral award extend to those Concerned Others that have been
identified as Concerned Others within the provided time limits, regardless of
whether they made use of their opportunity to join the arbitral proceeding as
53 The fourth paragraph of this section specifically sets out the order of priority amongst such
proceedings.
54 Please, note that any concerned others may join the proceeding either within a term of thirty days
after the filing of the statement of claim or within a subsequent term but subject to some
limitations on their rights. These limitations include, for instance, the impossibility to raise any
objections against the composition of the arbitral tribunal (s. 4.3).
55 Yet, the Rules clarify that any concerned others who have not joined the proceeding will not be
entitled to claim the reimbursement of the costs.
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party or intervenor.56 The arbitral award has binding effect on all
shareholders.57
Hence, we can come to the conclusion that the DIS corporate arbitration
system, with its special features, may be a sort of sui generis collective arbitration
with an opt-in approach that allows to settle the conflicts of a group of individuals.
5. Conclusion
36. Considering the increasing success that collective actions have experi-
enced over the last years alongside the deeply rooted tradition of arbitration in
Europe (despite the barriers that this alternative dispute resolution mechanism
is currently facing), we reckon that the possibility to submit collective actions
to arbitration will be a matter a time. For instance, even though the countries
of the European Union have long had a sceptical position regarding the US
class actions, the increasing use of standard-form contracts over the last
decades has made those countries finally reconsider their reluctance towards
this powerful tool. Furthermore, the success of arbitration has become con-
solidated throughout this period. Accordingly, it is very likely that these two
institutions (collective actions and arbitration) will finally meet each other,
although there still may be a long way to go.58
56 The truly innovative effect of the ‘Arbitrability II’ decision rendered by the Federal Supreme Court,
unprecedented in German arbitration law, is that the award rendered by an arbitral tribunal in
arbitral proceedings, where all these requirements have been met, has binding effect on all share-
holders regardless of whether they have opted to become a party to the arbitral proceedings. Thus,
for purposes of this type of dispute all shareholders of a GmbH are regarded to form a ‘group’ that
is collectively bound by the outcome of the arbitration, regardless of whether they have chosen to
participate in the proceedings. This indeed appears to be a characteristic feature of a ‘class’,
‘group’ or ‘collective’ arbitration, however one wants to call it (Christian BORRIS, in ICC Dossier
XIV- Class & Group Actions in Arbitration, p 83).
57 The ultimate purpose of the mechanism established by the DIS Supplementary Rules is to force
shareholders to either join the arbitral proceedings as a party (or intervenor) or else accept to be
bound by their outcome, i.e. an extension of the res judicata effect of an arbitral award to non-
parties to the arbitration (Christian BORRIS, in ICC Dossier XIV- Class & Group Actions in
Arbitration, p 85).
58 In any case, for the development of this type of arbitration in the Member States, policies favouring
arbitration must be firstly implemented. As observed above, this first step has been already taken in
Europe, where most States have their own arbitration regulations, showing a clear trend in favour of
this institution. Secondly, collective actions should be accepted in courts of justice. This practice starts
to become gradually incorporated into the European legal systems, even though it is not fully spread
yet. Starting from these two first premises, we will be able to begin to discuss collective arbitration.
The United States have given green light to the applicability of class action arbitration. Thus,
considering that Europe is no longer objecting to collective actions, the decision to implement
collective arbitration in Europe may be just a matter of time. See Gabrielle NATER-BASS, ‘Class Action
Arbitration: A New Challenge?’, in Ch. Müller & A. Rigozzi (eds), New Developments in International
Commercial Arbitration (Genève: Schulthess 2008).
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The current legal systems in Europe do not provide for the possibility to resort
to collective arbitration and, therefore, extending the collective protection of
rights to arbitration entails taking a step forward for which we are not ready
yet. However, nothing precludes the Member States from starting to develop a
sort of collective arbitration such as, for instance, the Spanish and German
systems. Even though such systems are not exactly arbitration systems
intended to settle collective actions as these are understood in the courts of
justice, these systems may somehow settle disputes affecting a group of indi-
viduals. The arbitration institutions may play a key role in this mission, as in
the United States, where the major arbitration institutions have been the ones
to establish class arbitration in their Regulations.
In any case, collective arbitration should be implemented in accordance with
the European Union’s own parameters. The principles supporting collective arbi-
tration should fit in with the legal system of the EU and with the legal systems of its
twenty-seven Member States. Europe cannot establish a US-like class arbitration
system that does not adhere to its legal traditions. Additionally, the adoption of a
voluntary participation (opt-in) system is essential. The European approach should
also deeply consider the need to prevent the adverse effects of the US class
arbitration and abusive litigation. For this purpose, the appropriate safeguards
should be established.
To sum up, the US class arbitration has been very controversial and, accord-
ingly, there is a great deal of reluctance towards the implementation of this system
in Europe. We should be aware, however, that this alternative dispute resolution
mechanism may play a significant role in the scenario of collective actions. As
pointed out by Professor S.I. Strong, one of the major experts on this subject, ‘it is
usually impossible to put the genie back into the bottle once it has escaped’.59
Thus, the best option will be to try to adapt this mechanism to the European
parameters.
59 Stacie STRONG, ‘Class Arbitration Outside the United States: Reading the Tea Leaves’, Legal
Studies Research Paper Series, Research Paper No. 2009-36, University of Missouri, @ssrn.
com/abstract=1517272.
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